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Looking at the Challenges of Enforcing Slavery
Law professor Steven Lubet focuses on three trials arising from the
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. After setting the scene by
describing the Constitution’s treatment of fugitive slaves and the Compromise of
1850, Lubet turns to Caster Hanway’s treason trial for participating in violent
resistance to a slave rendition in Christiana, Pennsylvania. Lubet brings a trial
lawyer’s sense to his detailed description of this as well as the other trials he
describes, detailing the strategic decisions the prosecutors and defense lawyers
made in light of the legal and evidentiary issues that they faced. Emphasizing
divisions within the prosecution camp and the overreaching of a treason charge,
which posed particular evidentiary problems in light of the Constitution’s
requirement that treason be proved by two witnesses to the defendant’s own acts,
Lubet shows how the defense attorneys exploited the usual disarray attending
large-scale disorder to secure their client’s acquittal.
Lubet then turns to the Anthony Burns rendition case in Boston. Under the
Fugitive Slave Act, the only real issue open to Burns and his supporters was to
challenge the claim that Burns was in fact the person described in the fugitive
warrant. Yet, there was little doubt that Burns was indeed the person sought.
Lubet shows how Burns’s attorneys sought unsuccessfully to impose extremely
high requirements of proof of identity to ensure that a free person was not
enslaved.
Finally, Lubet describes the rescue of John Price in Oberlin, Ohio, and the
ensuing trials of his rescuers – and the charges brought against his captors.
Lubet’s account of the rescue and the trials is quite lucid. He shows how the
abolitionist sentiment pervading the Western Reserve shaped the lawyers’
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strategic opportunities and limitations on all sides of the controversy.
Lubet suggests that the three trials show an evolution of anti-slavery legal
argument, from grudging acceptance of the Fugitive Slave Act’s constitutionality
to its rejection as inconsistent with the “higher law." In Lubet’s words, they
show “the eventual transformation of higher law from an abstract inspiration to
an unapologetic legal defense" (8). The Hanway treason trial dealt almost
exclusively with whether Hanway had in fact committed acts that counted as
treasonous. In the Burns rendition trial, the higher law made its appearance as a
reason for a strict burden of proof. In the Oberlin trials, the defense tried to
persuade judges and jurors to set aside the Fugitive Slave Act in the service of
the higher law.
There is certainly something to this suggestion, but Lubet may be pressing a
bit too hard. The issues in the trials differed. Hanway’s lawyers understood that
they could make a decent case on the facts, and so had little need to appeal
openly to the higher law. Rendition cases like Burns’s presented quite limited
opportunities for legal and factual arguments, and his lawyers did what they
could. The Oberlin trials were pretty much open and shut on the facts, with the
possible exception of the trial of Charles Langston (older brother of the more
famous John Mercer Langston), who had attempted to negotiate a peaceful
resolution of a stand-off between Price’s captors and his rescuers. With nothing
to say about the facts and with legal arguments foreclosed in practice, the
lawyers in these cases were almost forced to appeal to the higher law.
The three cases are familiar to specialists, but because Lubet trains his lens
on the trials themselves rather than the rescues and renditions, readers will get a
good sense of how lawyers went about enforcing and resisting the Fugitive Slave
Act. As a trial lawyer, Lubet knows where the lawyers made real decisions and
where they were playing to the galleries, although occasionally he seems to
import twenty-first century ethical standards into his descriptions. The trial
narratives move forward briskly, with good summaries of extended testimony
and long speeches by the lawyers in support of their legal and factual arguments.
Lubet has given us both a good read and a thoughtful analysis.
Mark Tushnet teaches constitutional law at Harvard Law School. He has
written on the legal aspects of slavery, and on the twentieth-century civil rights
movement.
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